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Abstract 
On 11 March 2004, terrorists in Madrid, Spain detonated bombs on several commuter trains. In total, 191 
people were killed and 1,400 were injured. After the bombing, examiners from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) identified a latent fingerprint found on a bag containing detonators and explosives as 
coming from an Oregon lawyer named Brandon Mayfield. Mayfield was arrested and held as a material 
witness for two weeks, until the Spanish National Police determined that the print did not, in fact, come 
from Mayfield, but from another man living in Spain. 
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On 11 March 2004, terrorists in Madrid, Spain detonated bombs on several commuter trains. In total, 191 people were killed and 1,400 were injured. After the bombing, examiners from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified a latent fingerprint 
found on a bag containing detonators and explosives as 
coming from an Oregon lawyer named Brandon Mayfield. 
Mayfield was arrested and held as a material witness for two 
weeks, until the Spanish National Police determined that the 
print did not, in fact, come from Mayfield, but from another 
man living in Spain. 
How did this happen? A “senior fingerprint examiner” at the 
FBI, who made the original identification, “‘consider[ed] it to 
be a 100% identification’ of Mayfield”. The match was verified 
by the unit chief of the FBI’s Latent Print Unit, “a retired FBI 
fingerprint examiner with over thirty years of experience”, 
and an independent fingerprint examiner “widely considered 
a leader in the profession”.1 After the error was uncovered, 
the Office of the Inspector General for the United States 
Department of Justice investigated Mayfield’s case. Among 
other findings, it concluded that “the unusual similarity of 
details on the fingers of Mayfield and the true source of the 
print … confused the FBI Laboratory examiners, and was an 
important factor contributing to the erroneous identification” 
(bit.ly/2Ezvbwr). 
Mayfield is far from the only person to suffer from a 
miscarriage of justice. Since 1989, more than 2,000 individuals 
have been exonerated after having been wrongfully 
convicted, according to the National Registry of Exonerations 
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(bit.ly/2EzTlXz). Disturbingly, around a quarter of those cases 
included “false or misleading forensic evidence”. 
One of the issues that can lead to errors in forensic analysis 
(as is apparent in Mayfield’s case) is the way in which 
examiners deal with uncertainty. In 2016, a report from the 
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
(PCAST) noted that forensic examiners frequently state 
that their conclusions about forensic evaluations are “100 
percent certain”; have error rates that are “essentially zero”, 
“vanishingly small”, or “microscopic”; or have a chance of error 
so remote as to be a “practical impossibility” (bit.ly/2EFU89o).
To a statistician, these characterisations of error in a process 
of human matching sound vague and implausible, but to a 
jury member or a judge they can sound very convincing. This 
is especially true when such characterisations come from 
an expert witness. What is not clear from the confidence 
statements is that they often reflect only the forensic analyst’s 
opinion about whether two items match or not, and they fail 
to take into account the value of that match. As demonstrated 
by Mayfield’s case (and many others), similarity alone is not 
sufficient to understand the value of an item of evidence. 
The lack of a proper foundation to discuss uncertainty in 
those values in forensic conclusions is likely to have led to 
wrongful convictions.
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A two-step process
To assess the probative value of a piece of evidence – how 
important it is in connecting a suspect to a crime – we need 
to understand two things: whether the crime scene and 
suspect-associated evidence appear to be similar, and, if so, 
what that similarity means. More specifically, we need to know 
(1) whether the evidence from the crime scene “matches” 
a sample from a suspect by some defined match criterion, 
and (2) how probable it is that a match by that criterion would 
occur by chance. Each of these components can be framed 
as a statistical question with an answer that can be estimated 
from data. 
It is important to differentiate between steps 1 and 2. 
Saying that two hairs are visually indistinguishable is 
different than saying that they are visually indistinguishable 
and therefore the one from the crime scene must have 
come from the suspect’s head. When analysts opine that 
two specimens come from the same source with near or 
complete certainty, they are frequently conflating steps 1 and 
2, assuming that only that source could have produced the 
measured characteristics.
But let us return to step 1. Today, how the level of similarity 
between items is established varies by evidence type. Ideally, 
some predefined set of characteristics should be measured 
on each piece of evidence, and those characteristics compared 
to each other. In some cases, this step is fairly objective and 
automated. For example, the similarity may be determined by 
a chemical analysis, using mass spectrometry to determine 
the trace element profile of a bullet or glass shard. In other 
cases, markings may initially be compared by an automated 
computer algorithm, as is the case with fingerprints or some 
ballistics comparisons (see page 31). In many cases, however, 
a final determination of whether two items match is made by 
subjective human judgement of trained examiners. 
In some disciplines the entire technique is subjective: 
comparisons of hair or bite marks, for example. In these 
cases, the characteristics and measurements may not even 
be defined in advance of the analysis. Such a procedure can 
contribute to confirmation bias; once a conclusion is tentatively 
reached, there is a tendency for individuals to focus on 
evidence that supports the existing belief. (This phenomenon 
is observed across fields, and is one of the reasons why 
predefined analysis protocols are required for many kinds of 
studies.) The 2016 PCAST report emphasised the importance 
of standardising the measurement and comparison of samples 
and developing automated methods wherever possible. In 
addition, rather than relying on a binary “match”–“no match” 
decision, one could also consider developing a similarity score, 
or level of matchingness, for this step. 
Step 2, determining what a match or given level of 
similarity means, is arguably the more challenging step of 
the process. To estimate how likely it is that two samples 
could match at a given level by chance, one needs to know 
how common are the characteristics used to determine the 
match. To estimate that, one needs data on the population 
from which the samples came. For example, in the case of 
single-source or simple-mixture DNA samples, one needs to 
know the prevalence of different DNA profiles in a population. 
Fortunately, DNA researchers have collected this kind of data 
in data sets that are probability samples from the populations 
of interest (see, for example, strbase.nist.gov). These data 
allow examiners to compute things like random match 
probabilities, to quantify the probability of chance matches.
If one wanted to reach a similarly supportable conclusion 
about the chance of seeing specific markings on a cartridge 
case, one would need to know about the population of guns 
in use in, for example, the country or the region where the 
crime occurred. If one wanted to know how likely it was that 
a glass shard came from a random car headlight, one would 
need to know about the population of glass headlights in the 
country or perhaps a certain county. Unfortunately, population 
reference data are not available in these domains.
Of course, the question remains: how much does this 
really matter in practice? Without the data, it is hard to know. 
However, we can at least consider what we do not know. 
Imagine some bullets are found at a crime scene, and a 
suspect also has bullets at her apartment. An analyst could 
analyse the elemental profile of the bullets. Then, the analyst 
could compare the measurements of those trace elements 
and determine whether those measurements match, within 
some level of error. If the crime scene and suspect bullets are 
clearly dissimilar, that alone might be enough to rule out the 
possibility that the two items are related. However, if they are 
similar, more information is needed to assess how important 
that finding is. A match would mean very different things if 
there are 100,000 similar bullets in a city with the same trace 
element profile than if there are only 20 bullets in the world 
with the same elemental signature. But a jury which heard 
only that the examiner was 100% certain that the bullets were 
a match would have no way of telling the difference. 
It is obviously impossible to examine every bullet in the 
world, or even in a city. However, it is possible to estimate 
population rates for characteristics from sampled data. If, for 
example, we had a database of bullets that was representative 
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suspect, they cannot tell us everything. Data on the frequency 
of characteristics in a population are needed to fully inform the 
jury or other fact-finder about the value of the particular piece 
of evidence they are considering – and that value is, ultimately, 
what they are being asked to consider.
Transparent analyses
Essentially, what we (and participants in the justice 
system) want to understand is the probability of seeing the 
evidence found at a crime scene if the suspect is innocent: 
P(Evidence | Innocent). A strong argument can be made that 
the question that a juror is most likely to care about is the 
probability that the suspect is guilty given that a piece of 
evidence is observed at a crime scene: P(Guilty | Evidence). This 
is much more difficult to estimate, so we focus on what we can 
estimate from the evidence and knowledge of the population 
from which that evidence comes, which is the probability of 
seeing the evidence given the suspect’s innocence. This is the 
probability of seeing the characteristics observed in the suspect 
evidence and in a random sample of that type of material.
In some areas, there has been a move to use likelihood 
ratios to summarise the probative value of evidence (see 
page 14). Using Bayes’ rule, we can write that as 
( )
( )
P GuiltyP(Guilty | Evidence) P(Evidence |Guilty)
.
P(Innocent | Evidence) P(Evidence |Innocent) P Innocent
= ×
In other words, posterior odds = likelihood ratio × prior odds. 
In theory, the prior odds are known by the juror or judge, and 
the likelihood ratio is estimated by the expert witness. The trier 
of fact then combines these two using Bayes’ rule (intuitively) 
to obtain a posterior odds, which determines how much 
more likely the suspect is to be guilty than innocent, given the 
evidence. Thus, the trier of fact has updated his or her belief 
that the individual is guilty after learning the likelihood ratio 
from the expert. 
Although the ratio form of Bayes’ rule provides a transparent 
way to interpret how individuals update their beliefs, there 
is an ongoing debate about the proper way to estimate the 
likelihood ratio. One of the concerns is that using different 
databases to set the denominator, P(Evidence | Innocent), 
could yield drastically different estimates of the ratio. Again, 
ideally the denominator should be estimated from population 
reference data. 
of all bullets that existed in the region (or country) where the 
crime occurred, this could help us understand the probability 
of a chance match. Unfortunately, for most areas of forensic 
science where such comparisons are made, data to estimate 
this probability are lacking. This includes comparative bullet 
lead analysis, the technique just described (see page 13 for 
more on this). 
In most domains, there are no population reference data 
sets. Even in domains where large databases exist – for 
example, as in fingerprints and ballistics – the data sets are not 
probability samples from an underlying population of interest 
and are not substitutes for them. That said, understanding 
the frequency of evidential characteristics in a very large 
but not representative data set could still provide important 
information. If, for example, we knew that certain types of 
fingerprint characteristics were incredibly common in the FBI’s 
Next Generation Identification (NGI) system, which stores 
fingerprint and other biometric information, we would know 
that the possibility of a random match on those characteristics 
is not small. However, criminal databases such as the NGI and 
the National Integrated Ballistics Information Network are not 
available to researchers. Currently, only in the case of DNA do 
we have the kind of data we need to estimate the probability 
of a random match.
‘Black box’ studies are not enough
In addition to calling for more objective methods, the 2016 
PCAST report discussed ways to improve our understanding 
of subjective methods in the interim, such as through “black 
box” studies to generate error rates (previously discussed on 
page 23). These studies invite examiners to “analyze samples 
and render opinions about the origin or similarity of samples”. 
They can be valuable in assessing how well a given technique 
works in practice, but their “black box” nature does not allow 
us to distinguish between human error in matching samples 
and very similar samples that happen to be from different 
sources. Therefore, they address a different question than the 
one we are discussing here. 
To estimate an error rate, one presents an examiner with a 
series of evidential comparisons where the truth of whether 
a crime scene sample is related to a subject is known. One 
then measures how many times the examiner gets the answer 
wrong, and divides that by the total number of comparisons. 
This is a straightforward measure to compute, but it does 
not fully tease out either examiner skill or the chance of a 
coincidental match. Rather, whether an examiner gets an 
answer right depends on several factors: the examiner’s skill, 
the inherent variation in a class of evidence, and the particular 
set of evidence they are asked to compare. 
If one wishes to truly understand the probative value of a 
particular piece of evidence, it is important to understand the 
probability that two items will match by chance under the 
criteria an examiner uses. In other words, while black box 
studies can tell us something important about the likelihood 
that an examiner is correct or incorrect in his or her conclusion 
that a piece of trace evidence matches a sample from a 
For most areas of forensic 
science where such 
comparisons are made, data 
to estimate the probability of 
a chance match are lacking
Dana M. Delger is a 
staff attorney in the 
Strategic Litigation 
Unit of the Innocence 
Project, which uses 
the courts strategically 
to address the 
leading causes of 
wrongful conviction, 
including eyewitness 
misidentification and 
the misapplication of 
forensic sciences.
Bill Eddy is the John 
C. Warner Professor 
of Statistics, Emeritus, 
at Carnegie Mellon 
University, with 
appointments in 
the Department of 
Biological Sciences, 
Machine Learning 
Department, and the 
Center for the Neural 
Basis of Cognition.
27April 2019    significancemagazine.com 
Furthermore, the selection of probabilistic models for 
the likelihood ratio – a part of the process that is up to a 
statistician or expert to select – also affects the results. So, 
even if estimating the likelihood ratio is the best means of 
communicating this information in the abstract, whoever 
does this must tread carefully in, and be very clear about, 
the analysis selected and its assumptions, and those choices 
must be clearly communicated to the fact-finder. It also bears 
repeating that a move to likelihood ratios does not on its own 
solve the problem this article addresses: the lack of data for 
calculating the chance of a random match. Likelihood ratios 
cannot absolve the examiner of needing to have empirical data 
supporting his or her claim about the value of a match. 
Next steps
We agree with the recommendations made by expert panels 
so far. While error rate studies are not a panacea, more well-
designed studies would greatly aid our understanding of 
how often errors are occurring in practice. Such studies still 
add important information to our understanding of the value 
of forensic science evidence. For example, it is now widely 
accepted that errors in DNA analysis are overwhelmingly 
due to examiner error rather than chance matches. Most 
likely, population reference studies in other domains will 
find different rates of chance matches. Our point is not that 
everything can and should be like DNA, but that we need to 
understand the value each type of evidence provides. 
For now, it is clear that there are many obstacles to properly 
expressing the uncertainty in a forensic match. First, forensic 
analysts and scientists promoting the reform of forensic 
science must understand that two quantities are necessary: 
the probability that the evidence from the crime scene 
matches a sample from a suspect and the probability that 
this match could occur by chance. Second, to estimate these 
probabilities, adequate databases of forensic evidence must 
be generated. Finally, experts must present their analyses of 
the data in a transparent way, by describing their assumptions 
for modelling and data selection.
We are encouraged by efforts to build forensic databases 
that enable initial investigations into these questions, 
including the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Ballistic Toolmark Research Database (tsapps.nist.
gov/NRBTD), and the forthcoming forensic fingerprint 
database under development at NIST. Other researchers, 
including our colleagues in the Center for Statistics and 
Applications in Forensic Evidence, are developing databases of 
steganography images and elemental glass composition, and 
some of us are planning a database of tool-mark striations. All 
of these efforts will help us begin to assess the characteristics 
that provide the most information about different types of 
evidence. However, the “begin” in the preceding sentence 
is important. A huge need remains for access to larger data 
sets, such as those maintained by law enforcement, and for 
intentional collection of sampled data designed to represent 
a population. 
Until we have access to such data sets, it is impossible 
to know how many cases like Brandon Mayfield’s are out 
there but not discovered, or how many techniques suffer 
from the issues that plagued bullet lead analysis (see 
page 13). Conversely, it is impossible to fully characterise 
the value that many analyses provide. We fully expect that 
many forensic comparison techniques provide a great deal 
of useful information, and access to population reference 
data would enable us to characterise their value. Addressing 
these challenges will enable forensic analysts to present the 
uncertainty in their conclusions, better equipping judges and 
juries to use that evidence in their determination of whether 
someone is innocent or guilty of a crime. n
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